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THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF REGULATION FD
ON THE CAPITAL MARKETS
I.

INTRODUCTION

On August 10, 2000 the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") passed by a vote of 3-1,1 Regulation Fair Disclosure ("FD"), which went into effect on October 23, 2000.2 Champi-

oned by former SEC Commissioner Arthur Levitt, Regulation FD was
created largely in response to complaints from retail investors who objected to the inequity regarding access to investment information.3
Many of the complaints alleged that the investment playing field is balanced unequally in favor of investment analysts and their favored clients because corporations have selectively disclosed material
information, particularly annual-earnings forecasts, to their clients
before they are released to the general public. This gives larger investors and individuals with longstanding relationships with their analysts
an unfair advantage. 4 Six thousand comment letters were sent to the
SEC in support of the Regulation during its comment period; 5 however, those who lobbied for the implementation of Regulation FD may
be surprised to find that their efforts have left them with even less in6
formation than was available prior to the Regulation's enactment.
A special study conducted by then acting SEC Chairwoman Laura
S. Unger was released in December, 2001 in response to growing criticism that the Regulation has decreased the amount and quality of investment information coming from corporations and contributed to
1.

SecuritiesDisclosure:Divided SECApproves Modified Rule LimitingSelective Disclosure

of Information, UNrrED STATES LAw WEEK, 69 U.S. L. WK. 2093 (2000).

2. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7881,
34-43154, IG-24599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 [hereinafter Final Release], at http://
iv.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm (Oct. 23, 2000).
3. Final Release, supra note 2, at 51,716;Jed Graham, Levitt's Legacy: SEC Reforms
Could Help On-line Investors, INvEsroRs Bus. DAILY, Feb. 22, 2001, at A9.
4. Jeff D. Opdyke, The Big Chill: Street Feels Effect of "FairDisclosure"Rule- Regulation
is Altering the Way Analysts Approach TheirJobs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2000, at C1.
5. Final Release, supra note 2, at 51,717.
6. Bruce Machmeier, FairDisclosure or Flawed Disclosure?Regulation FD, the SEC's
Attempt to PromoteFairDisclosureof CorporateInformation to All Investors Might Well Have the
Opposite Effect, STAR TRiB., (Minneapolis, MN), Oct. 23, 2000, at 3D.
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the volatility in the capital markets. 7 The special study, which focused
on public surveys and the SEC Roundtable Discussion (the "Roundtable") held in April, 2001, suggested adjustments to the Regulation
but did not address the overall effect of the Regulation on the capital
market system. 8
More than a year has passed since the enactment of Regulation
FD. Many market professionals feel that not only has there been a
decline in the quality and quantity of information provided by public
corporations as a result of Regulation FD, but that corporations facing
financial difficulty are using the Regulation as a shield against having
to answer questions about their future earnings. 9 Furthermore, market professionals suspect that the Regulation has contributed to the
severe price movements affecting the capital markets. 10
This note addresses the negative consequences of Regulation FD
and examines the Regulation's effect on investors, the effects on the
relationship between analysts and issuers, the ramifications on small
corporations, the Regulation's relationship to volatility in the capital
markets, and finally presents an argument to revise the Regulation.
II.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF REGULATION

FD

Regulation FD is a new issuer disclosure rule that specifically addresses the selective disclosure of "material non-public"" information.' 2 It is designed to promote full and fair disclosure of information
by issuers and to curtail selective disclosure, which is believed to have
diminished investor confidence and compromised the integrity of the
capital markets.' 3 According to the release of the Final Rule, Regulation FD, the amendments to form 8-K, Rule lOb5-1, and Rule 10b5-2
were adopted under the authority of Sections 13, 15, 23 and 36 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), Sections 10, 19(a),
7. SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger, Special Study: Regulation FairDisclosure Revisited, SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger, at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm(Dec. 6, 2001) [hereinafter Special Study].
8. Special Study, supra note 7, at n.8, n.66.
9. Special Study, supra note 7, at n.ll.
10. Analysts, Portfolio Managers Say Volume, Quality of Information Have Fallen, SEC.
WK., April 9, 2001, at 9.
11. Final Release, supra note 2, at 51,719.
12. Id.
13. Id.at 51,716, 51,717.
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and 28 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"), and Section 30
of the Investment Company Act of 1940.14
Regulation FD applies to companies that have securities registered
under Section 12 of the Exchange Act and to companies required to
file reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, which includes
closed-end business corporations, but does not include other investment companies, foreign private companies or foreign governments. 15
Regulation ED does not apply to Initial Public Offerings or unregistered offerings 16 or to disclosures made through the use of Form 8-K
17
or other SEC authorized methods of public disclosure.
Rule 100 of Regulation FD sets forth the basic requirement with
regard to selective disclosure whenever an issuer, or person acting on
its behalf, discloses material nonpublic information to certain enumerated persons. 18 "Certain enumerated persons" 19 refers to securities
market professionals and holders of a company's securities who may
trade on the information, but does not refer to members of the press,
entities that issue credit ratings or any person with a duty of
20
confidence.
Under Regulation FD, corporations must make public disclosure
of that same information simultaneously for intentional disclosure or
promptly 2 ' for unintentional disclosures. 22 The SEC defines intentional disclosure as disclosure by an individual who either knows or is
reckless in not knowing, prior to making the disclosure, that the material being communicated is material and not public. 2 3 Prompt disclosure for an unintentional disclosure of information is defined as being
as soon as reasonably practicable or within twenty four hours. 24 The
14.

Id. at 51,737.

15.
16.

Id. at 51,724.
Id. at 51,725.

17. Id. at 51,723(other methods include a combination of "filing a Form 8-K, by
distributing a press release through a widely disseminated news or wire service, or by an
other non-exclusionary method of disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide
broad public access, such as announcement at a conference of which the public had
notice and to which the public was granted access, either by personal attendance, or
telephonic or electronic access.").
18. Id. at 51,719.
19. Id.
20.
21.

Id.
Prompt Disclosure is within 24 hours.

22.
23.
24.

Final Release, supra note 2, at 51,722.
Id. at 51,723.
Id. at 51,722.
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Regulation is only applicable to "persons acting on behalf of an issuer" 25 and defines them as corporate officers, directors, investment
relations persons, public relations officers or employees possessing
equivalent functions. 26 "Persons acting on behalf of an issuer" 27 can
face individual enforcement action by the SEC and be held civilly liable for causing the violation in a cease-and-desist order or as an aider
and abettor in an injunctive action. 2 8 According to the Regulation, an
issuer or anyone acting on its behalf is required to publicly disclose
material information if they are going to reveal that information to
29
anyone privately.
Rule 101(e) of Regulation FD clarifies the permissible forms of
public disclosure.3 0 The Final Release of Regulation FD specifically
states that presenting the information on a corporation's website does
not fulfill the public disclosure requirement after an intentional or
non-intentional leak of information, but that as technology evolves,
and more investors have access to the Internet, it could become sufficient.3 ' Until then, the SEC recommends using the listed alternatives,
32
or combination of alternatives.
The Final Release of Regulation FD clarifies liability issues by emphasizing that "Regulation FD is an issuer disclosure rule that is designed to create duties only under Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Exchange Act and Section 30 of the Investment Company Act."3 3 Furthermore, the Final Release clearly states that the Regulation is not an
anti-fraud rule and was not created to establish new responsibilities
under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws or in private lawsuits, nor does it nullify the safe harbor provisions under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.3 4 Penalties for violat25. Id. at 51,720.
26. Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id. at 51,726.
29. SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2002) ("Whenever an issuer, or any
person acting on its behalf, discloses any material nonpublic information regarding
that issuer or its securities to any person described in paragraph (b) (1) of this section,
the issuer shall make public disclosure of that information as provided in
§ 243.101 (e).")
30. Final Release, supra note 2, at 51,723.
31. Id. at 51,725.
32. Id. at 51,723.
33. Id. at 51,726.
34. Id.
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ing Regulation FD may consist of a cease-and-desist order, a civil action
seeking injunctory relief and/or civil money penalties.3 5
Finally, the SEC made amendments to Form 8-K and promulgated
two other rules along with Regulation FD, both of which clarify the
scope of existing insider trading prohibitions. 36 First, Rule 10b5-1 addresses insider trading liability arising in connection with a trader's use
of "material non-public"3 7 information.3 8 The rule is designed to resolve existing conflict in the courts over whether a defendant used the
information in trading or if a defendant traded in knowing possession
of the information.3 9 Second, Rule 10b5-2 addresses the situation in
which a breach of a family or other non-business relationship gives rise
40
to liability under the misappropriation theory of insider trading.
Im.

IssuFs

SuRRouNDING REGULATION

FD

The Debate Over the Meaning of "MaterialNon-Public 4 1 Information
As of October 23, 2000, a company that is subject to the reporting
requirements of the Exchange Act, or an issuer, can no longer selecA.

42
information about itself.43
tively disclose "material non-public"

There has been a great deal of critical discussion concerning the definition of "material nonpublic" 44 information. 45 Corporations are hav46
ing difficulty discerning what is and is not "material nonpublic"
information for purposes of disclosure due to the grey area created by
47
the SEC's ambiguous definition of "materiality."
In its release of the Final Rule for Regulation FD, the SEC relied
on the definition of materiality set forth by the Supreme Court in TSC
Industries v. Northway Inc.4 8 The Supreme Court in TSC Industries
35.

Id.

36.
37.
38.

Id. at 51,716.
Id. at 51,721.
Id. at 51,727.

39.

Id.

40.
41.
42.

Id. at 51,729.
Id. at 51,721.
Id.

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46. Id.
47. Paul Kedrosky, The Trouble With Full Disclosure: U.S. RegulationID Has Produced
An Information Chil, Not FairDisclosure, NAT'L Posr, Nov. 4, 2000, at Dl, available at
2000 WL 28909250.
48. TSC Indus. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
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found information to be material if "' [t] here is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important' in making
an investment decision." 4 9 According to the SEC, they have provided
issuers with adequate guidance on the issue of materiality so far as they
have provided examples of such information in the release of the final
rule.5 0 The examples the SEC believes to represent "material non-public" 5 1 information are: (1) "earnings information; (2) mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint ventures, or changes in assets; (3) new
products or discoveries, or developments regarding customer or suppliers" (i.e. "the acquisition or loss of a contract); (4) changes in control or in management;" (5) a "change in auditors or auditor
notification that the issuer may no longer rely on an auditor's report;"
(6) events regarding the issuer's securities (i.e. a default on debt securities, call of securities for redemption, stock splits or changes in dividends); and (7) bankruptcies or receiverships. 52 These examples
however, do not clear up the confusion over what is or is not material
because the examples given are not per se material and are therefore
subject to interpretation. 53 In a letter to their clients, the law firm of
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson advised that materiality questions should be carefully reviewed by counsel, a practice that could
help them fare better in an after the fact review by the SEC. 54 How-

ever, seeking advice from counsel every time there is a disclosure issue
does not necessarily resolve existing confusion because the imprecise
definition of materiality provided by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries may nevertheless lead to questioning by the SEC even if legal ad55
vice was appropriately given and followed.
The December, 2001 Special Study conducted by Laura S. Unger,
acknowledged the lack of guidance regarding the definition of materiality in the release of the Final Rule. She believes the SEC should clarify what information needs to be made public under the Regulation by
49.

Id. at 449.

50.

Final Release, supra note 2, at 51,721.

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Rethinking DisclosurePolicies and Practices in the Wake of
the SEC's New Selective DisclosureRules, at 193, 195 (Sept. 15, 2000) in SECURITIES LAW AND
THE INTERNET: DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN THE REGULATION FD ERA, Corporate Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series, No. B-1258 (2001).
55. See Special Study, supra note 7, at III(A) (1); See also TSC Indus. v. Northway,

Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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more clearly defining what is "material non-public" 56 information. 57 A
February, 2001 survey by the Association for Investment Management
and Research ("AIMR") indicated that 71% of its respondents 58 believe that " [r] egulators and the investment industry need to develop a
more precise legal definition of 'materiality.' 59 According to a Securities Industry Association ("SIA") assessment of Regulation FD, 60 the
lack of clarity in the definition of materiality has hindered the free flow
of information and left investors with less information than before the
61
Regulation was promulgated.
This ambiguity is exemplified by a situation that occurred on September 22, 2000.62 Conseco Inc., a troubled insurer, met with a hand-

picked group of investors, analysts and reporters to explain its plan to
restructure its debt. 63 Conseco also put out a press release which provided the skeletal details of the restructuring. 64 Consequently, uninvited investors and news organizations complained bitterly, claiming
selective disclosure. 65 Conseco contended that its conduct was not violative of the Regulation. In fact, in a clear example of the ambiguity
surrounding what is "material nonpublic" 66 information, both Conseco and the uninvited investors and news organizations claim Regulation FD in support of their respective argument. 67 At this point in
time, the question raised in the Conseco debate has yet to be answered
68
leaving open the question as to whose argument will prevail.
56. Final Release, supra note 2, at 51,721.
57. Special Study, supra note 7, at II(A)(1) (c).
58. The AIMR survey was sent to 6,100 of its U.S. members who are equity analysts,
fixed-income analysts, credit analysts, and portfolio managers. More information is
available at http://vv.aimr.com/pressroom/gnes/tnewsltr.html.
59. Viewpoint: Regulation FD in the Spotlight, The Financial Journalist, at http://
www.amr.com/pressroom/gnews/ newsltr.html (Apr. 2001).
60. Costs and Benefits of RegulationFairDisclosure,Securities Industry Association, at
http://iw.sia.com (May, 2001).
61. Id.
62. Heather Timmons, This Tull Disclosure'Rule Could Mean More Secrets, Bus. WK.,
Oct. 9, 2000, at 198.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Final Release, supra note 2, at 51,721.
67. Timmons, supra note 62, at 198.
68. Id.
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B. Intentional v. Non-Intentional Disclosure
The SEC's differentiation between intentional and non-intentional disclosure under Regulation FD is problematic. 69 The SEC
states that in order for an issuer to be held liable for intentional disclosure, the corporation must have known or been reckless in not
knowing that the information disclosed was both material and nonpublic, as both are required. 70 According to the release of the Final Rule,
circumstances alone can differentiate between an intentional and nonintentional disclosure and this, the SEC claims, protects a corporation
when the issue of materiality is not clear. 7 1 In the release of Final Rule
it was noted that:
in the case of a selective disclosure attributable to a mistaken determination of materiality, liability will arise only
if no reasonable person under the circumstances would
have made the same determination. As a result, the circumstances in which a selective disclosure is made may be
important. We recognize, for example, that a materiality
judgement that might be reckless in the context of a prepared written statement would not necessarily be reckless
in the context of an impromptu answer to an unantici72
pated question.
The problem with allowing circumstances to differentiate between an
intentional and unintentional disclosure is lack of consistency. When
an issuer's intention is determined by a SEC evaluation of circumstance, a corporation that does not want to risk liability under the Regulation will want to avoid any situation that could be interpreted as
intentional and as a result make public only conservative, less meaningful information when they do decide to disclose or in the alternative
73
not to disclose at all.
C.

The Effects of Regulation FD on the Flow of Investment Information

Although the new Regulation is designed to create fair disclosure
so that all investors have simultaneous access to the same information,
the conduct of many corporations, in an effort to comply with the Reg69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Final Release, supra note 2, at 51,722.
Id.
Id. at 51,723.
Id. at 51,722.
Special Study, supra note 7, at n.l1.
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ulation, has inadvertently frustrated the goal of the Regulation. 74 The
decline in the quantity and quality of issuer information made available is not only a result of issuers using the regulation as a shield in
order to avoid answering difficult questions but also due to general
uncertainty surrounding what the new Regulation really requires. 75
An example of using the Regulation as a shield occurred as early
as August, 2000. US Bancorp, in an early effort to comply with the
Regulation, canceled its scheduled conference call to analysts at Credit
Suisse First Boston because the company president resigned the previous day and the bank did not want to answer any questions concerning
that or other related issues, which would have likely included the
bank's future strategies. 7 6 Furthermore, a survey by the Association for
Investment Management and Research ("AIMR") indicated that 81%
of the survey's respondents felt that companies could more effectively
minimize communications with investors after the promulgation of
Regulation FD. 77 Clearly, this was not the result the SEC had intended
when it promulgated Regulation FD. 78 While the goal of the Regulation claimed by the SEC was to halt selective disclosure, the practical
effect of the Regulation has been to limit disclosure and not only silence dialogue between corporations and analysts but also degrade the
quality of information that is made available. 79
The SEC Roundtable, which included CFOs, in-house lawyers, investor relations officers, analysts and investors, discussed the decrease
in the flow of issuer information since the advent of Regulation FD. 80
A study of Regulation FD done by the SIA revealed that the Regulation
did not substantially increase the amount of investment information
flowing from issuers to investors and that there had in fact been a "chil74.

Bob Keefe, What's Ahead for Tech Earnings?Silent Execs Cite Poor 'Visibility' With

Tech Quotes, Cox NEws SERVICE, Feb. 22, 2001.

75. Special Study, supra note 7, at II(C), III(A) (1); Costs and Benefits of Regulation
FairDisclosure, Securities Industry Association, at http://www.sia.com (May, 2001).
76. Timmons, supra note 62, at 198.
77. Viewpoint: Regulation FD in the Spotlight, The Financial Journalist, at http://
wivw.aimr.com/pressroom/

78.
79.

news/gnewsltr.html (Apr., 2001).

See Final Release, supra note 2, at 51,716.
Viewpoint: Regulation FD in the Spotlight, The Financial Journalist, at http://

vv.aimr.com/pressroom/fnews/fnewsltr.html (Apr., 2001); Costs and Benefits of Regulation Fair Disclosure, Securities Industry Association, at http://wIVw.sia.com (May,

2001).
80.

Special Study, supra note 7, at I.
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ling effect." 81 Furthermore, the SIA study indicated that the quality of
investment information has decreased in the advent of Regulation
FD. 8 2 The SIA study indicated the following:
Seventy-two percent of analysts interviewed by the SIA and
56% of analysts surveyed by the AIMR feel that information communicated by issuers to the public is of lower
quality than information made public prior to implemen83
tation of the regulation.
Another survey conducted in February, 2001 by the AIMR revealed
that 57% of those responding to the survey felt the volume of substantive information disseminated by issuers had decreased.8 4 In response
to the "Roundtable"discussion and both the SIA and AIMR studies, Ms.
Unger announced in her December, 2001 special report the need for
an inquiry into the amount and type of information that issuers are
disclosing to investors. 8 5 The special report commented on a number
of suggestions made at the Roundtable and noted that issuers have
made less information available because they have shifted the decisionmaking process regarding disclosure issues from the investor relations
department to the legal department, which frequently takes a conservative standpoint so as to avoid violating Regulation FD.86 While
opinions regarding the decrease in quantity and quality of issuer information were not the only ones expressed at the "Roundtable" discussion, the fact that panelists suggested the existence of this problem
indicates that the Regulation has not satisfied its intended purpose.
D. Dealing with False Rumors on the Internet in the
Wake of Regulation FD
Another problem created by the implementation of Regulation
87
FD is how to deal with false rumors that circulate on the Internet.
SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger stated in a speech given at the 19th
Annual Ray Garrett Jr. Corporate and Securities Law Institute that
81.
Costs and Benefits of RegulationFairDisclosure, Securities Industry Association, at
http://vv.sia.com (May, 2001).
82. Id.
83. Id. at *n.9.
84. Viewpoint: Regulation FD in the Spotlight, The Financial Journalist, at http://
Nvww.aimr.com/pressroom/fnews/fjnewsltr.html (Apr., 2001).
85. Special Study, supra note 7, at IIIB.
86. Id. at *n.12.
87. Craig A. Adoor et al., Focus on Message Boards, Chat Rooms: Addressing Adverse
Effects that Presented by Posting Misuse, N.Y. LJ. Sept. 20, 2000, at 9.
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"[t]he number one subject by far on Internet chat rooms and bulletin
boards is companies and their stocks... this creates an environment
where a company's stock is susceptible to moving very quickly on unconfirmed rumors or fraudulent information."8 8 The occurrence of
these rumors is on the rise8 9 and the effects of these rumors can be
devastating to a corporation. 90 Section 17(b) of the Securities Act of
1933, a criminal provision, addresses fraudulent descriptions of securities and applies to any security and any person. 9 1 However, according
to In Re Washington PublicPower Supply System Securities Litigation,92 Congress did not provide for a private right of action under Section
17(b). 9 3 Furthermore, while the section is an important consideration
in dealing with Internet fraud, the pertinent issue is not where the
rumor originated or who started it, but rather how a corporation can
respond to the rumor without violating Regulation FD.
A corporations' first reaction to an rumor circulated on the Internet is often the desire to respond by posting a message on the Internet of its own to refute the rumor.9 4 However, responding in order
to discredit the rumor might require disclosing information that was
previously not intended to be made public by the corporation. 95 A
corporation's posting of previously undisclosed information on a message board is not enough to comply with regulation FD's disclosure
guidelines 96 and the corporation, in trying to defend itself from damaging rumors, could inadvertently expose itself to a Regulation FD violation. 97 As a result, corporations are likely to resist posting rebuttals
on message boards.98 Corporations are instead required to issue a
press release and simultaneously file a Form 8-K with the SEC in addi88. Laura S. Unger, Corporate Communications Without Violations: How Much
Should Issuers Tell Their Analysts and When, Address at the 19th Annual Ray Garrett

Jr. Corporate and Securities Law Institute, at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
speecharchive/1999/spch273.htm (Apr. 23, 1999).
89. Adoor, supra note 87.

90.
91.

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2001).

92.

In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir.

1987).
93. LARRY D. SODERQUIST ET AL., SECURITIs REGULATION, 309 (4th ed. 1999) (quoting In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1987)).
94. Adoor, supra note 87.

95.

Id.

96.
97.

Final Release, supra note 2, at 51,724.
Adoor, supra note 87.

98.

Id.
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tion to any public exchange disclosure requirements.9 9 Furthermore,

the company will have to issue a general press release and post in addition to posting the release on its website because while posting on the
company website is essential since the target audience is on the worldwide web, it is not enough to satisfy the Regulation's posting requirements. 10 0 Therefore, the corporation is required to make major
public disclosure instead of being able to deal with the problem discretely and quickly. 10 1 Many corporate executives are conflicted because while they will want to refute false claims, they may not want to

publicly disclose information in a general press release in order to do
so.10 2 Furthermore, many corporations have "no comment" policies
which are in place to avoid "entanglement" issues resulting from hav-

ing to update any comments they might make on their websites in re1
sponse to rumors or incorrect information posted on the Internet.

E.

03

Degrading CorporateRelations with Analysts

Regulation FD has negatively effected how corporations deal with
10 5
financial analysts. 10 4 In an October, 2000 speech by Laura S. Unger,
she noted that Regulation FD adversely affected analyst and issuer relationships.1 0 6 Analysts no longer have the access to information that
they did before the promulgation of the Regulation and the result is
less accurate predictions.10 7 The February, 2001 survey by the AIMR
indicated that 43% of investment professionals who responded to the
survey had less confidence in the accuracy of their earnings forecasts
99. Id.; see also New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual (NYSE's Timely
Alert Policy is similar to Reg. FD disclosure requirements but maintains that the use of a
press release is the most effective method to disseminate material information to the
public.).
100. Id.; see also Final Release, supra note 2, at 51,724.
101. Adoor, supra note 87; see also New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual (maintaining that disclosure on a company website is not enough to fulfill the exchange's disclosure requirements.).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. JefflD. Opdyke The Big Chill: Street Feels Effect of "FairDisclosure"Rule- Regulation
is Altering the Way Analysts Approach TheirJobs, Analysts Feel Shackled by the New Regulations,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2000, at Cl.
105. Laura S. Unger, Fallout From Regulation FD, Has the SEC Finally Cut the
Tightrope? Remarks at the Glasser LegalWorks Conference on SEC Regulation FD, at
http://vwwi.sec.gov/news/speech/spch421.htm (Oct. 27, 2000).
106. Id.
107. Costs and Benefits of Regulation FairDisclosure,Securities Industry Association, at
http://v.sia.com (May, 2001).
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since Regulation FD went into effect.' 0 8 Key ingredients, like operational efficiencies and company product mixes, which came directly
from the company, are no longer available. 10 9
Furthermore, the decrease in information disclosed has hampered the "mosaic" process" 0 and analysts have noted that it is now
impossible to complete the "mosaic" even when additional research is
done."' This can have a detrimental effect on the investing public
since as the SIA survey indicates, the majority of investors rely on analysts for their investment decisions and any impact on the quality of
their research will certainly be felt by the investing public who use professional investment services. 112 The Regulation effectually shifts the
inequity in availability of investment information from individual retail
investors who do not use investment services to those who do use inl
vestment services.1 3
Lastly, the securities market requires a higher level of disclosure
than most other markets and the individual investor "[n]eeds this information to be presented in a relatively standardized and uniform
fashion to facilitate comparisons among securities""14 in order to effectively participate in the market. 115 Regulation ED does not reflect
these needs or the Supreme Court's endorsement of the "screening"
role of the financial analyst, 1 6 the very person who provides corporate
information in a "relatively standardized and uniform fashion." 1 7 The
Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC" 8 found analysts to be "necessary to
the preservation of a healthy market."" 19 But if analysts are less confident in their work product after the advent of Regulation FD, how
108. Viewpoint: Regulation FD in the Spotlight, The Financial Journalist, at http://
www.aimr.com/pressroom/fnews/fjnewsltr.html (Apr., 2001).
109. Opdyke, supra note 104.
110. The mosaic process is the process by which an analysts combine their own

research with pieces of non-material information gathered from conversations with issuer insiders in order to formulate an earnings forecast for that particular corporation.
111. Costs and Benefits of RegulationFairDisclosure, Securities Industry Association at
http://iwv.sia.com (May, 2001).

112. Id.; see also Regulation ID Hurts Investors and Contributes to Market Volatility Says
SM, 6 No. 21 ANDREWS SEC. Lrr. & REG. REP., (June 6, 2001).
113.
114.

Regulation FD Background, at http://www.sia.com/reg..fd.htm.
RICHARD IV. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURrTIES REGULATION 3 (9th ed. 1998).

115.

Id.

116.

J. Scott Colesanti, Bouncing the Tightrope: Tthe S.E.C. Attacks Selective Disclosure,

but Provides Little Stabilityfor Analysts, 25 S.ILL. U. L.J. 1, 3 (2000).
117.

RICHARD w. JENNINGS ET At., SECURTES REGULATION 3 (9th ed. 1998).
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valuable can their evaluations really be? SEC Commissioner Laura Unger, in an October, 2000 speech, noted that the goal of Regulation FD
contradicts the following statement made by the Supreme Court in
Dirks v. SEC: "[i] t is the nature of [anaylsts' judgements about companies and their securities], and indeed of the markets themselves, that
such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the
corporation's stockholders or the public generally." 120 The Supreme
Court's conclusions regarding the importance of analysts in a healthy
market economy along with their decision in Dirks v. SEC, which permits selective disclosure in instances that do not create a "personal
benefit,"12 1 indicates that selective disclosure should be dissociated
with insider trading and maintained as an integral component of a
functioning market economy.
F

Negative Effects on Smaller Corporations

Regulation FD's interference with the role of market analysts particularly affects smaller corporations 122 because much of the services
an analyst provides are differentiations between corporate products.
In doing this, analysts rely on the information obtained from the corporation itself.123 Corporate relationships with market analysts are
particularly important for small corporations as they maintain market
interest in a corporation. 12 4 Furthermore, the relationship between
the company and the analyst has served as a bridge between the flood
of information from a corporation to the investor, 125 and smaller corporations rely the heaviest on analyst forums to gain coverage of their
stocks.1 26 Regulation FD will decrease the amount of information disseminated at these forums resulting in smaller corporations having less
27
exposure of their stock to investors.1
120. Laura S. Unger, Fallout From Regulation FD, Has the SEC Finally Cut the
Tightrope? Remarks at the Glasser LegalWorks Conference on SEC Regulation FD, at

http://wv.sec.gov/news/speech/spch421.htm (Oct. 27, 2000).
121. Dirks, 463 U.S. 646.
122. Heidi Elliot, Is FairDisclosure a Foul Deal?. Analysts Say New Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation Could Backfire, ENEWS, Oct. 2, 2000, at 4.
123. Id.; see also Robert B. Thompson et al., F. Hodge O'Neal Corporateand Securities
Law Symposium: CorporateAccountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 615, 619-20 (2001).
124. Elliot, supra note 122.
125. Thompson, supra note 123, at 619-20.
126. Elliot, supra note 122.
127. Id.
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Another negative consequence that particularly effects smaller issuers is the cost associated with making a public disclosure.' 2 8 Disclosure is a costly endeavor as it requires a detailed analysis of the balance
between the benefit of disclosure against the cost of legal services associated with making difficult materiality decisions, "the cost of making
[a] disclosure in a public setting or filing, and the demand for scarce
management time." 129 After balancing these issues, many smaller corporations now have decided to disclose on a less frequent basis.' 30
G.

The Negative Effects on Investors

Corporate executives have expressed concern over Regulation
FD's weakening effect on the value of information the investment analyst provides to investors and feel that the Regulation will not only have
a detrimental effect on smaller investors who do not consult investment analysts but also individuals who do.' 3 '
Although the Regulation intends to provide equal access to investment information for everyone, the investor "playing field" 32 will not
be equal for all as individual investors do not have the capability to
digest all the available information provided by the issuer as that information is intended for individuals with years of experience in the industry.' 3 3 It is unrealistic to assume that by giving information to
everyone, everyone will have an equal ability to understand that information and make trades based on it.13 4 Once the information is public, the large investor with fast and effective in-house analyst support is
going to benefit; on the other hand, the average on-line investors will
be far behind in the timing of their trade because they will need much
128. SIA survey ParticipantsSay Beg FD's 'ChillingEffect' On 'Quantity,' 'Quality,' of Information Puts Investors At a Disadvantage:Clarificationof Materiality StandardMay Improve
Flow of FinancialAnalysis to Investors, Securities Industry Association, at http://www.sia.
com/press/html/prchi__fd.html (May 17, 2001).
129. Matthew W. Quigley, InitialExperience with Regulation H) in the High-Yield Debt
Market, April 24, 2001 Regulation FD Roundtable, The Bond Market Association, at http:/
/www.bondmarkets.com/regulatory/regfdletter.shtml (Apr. 20, 2001).
130. Id.
131. Costs andBenefits of RegulationFairDisclosure,Securities Industry Association, at
http://www.sia.com (May, 2001) Regulation FD Hurts Investors and Contributes to Market
Volatility Says SIA, 6 No. 21 ANDREws SEC. Lrr. & REG. REP. 3 (June 6, 2001).
132. Final Release, supra note 2, at 51,716.
133. See Regulation FD Hurts Investors and Contributes to Market Volatility Says SIA, 6
No. 21 ANDamvs SEc. Lrr. & REG. REP.3 (June 6, 2001).
134. See Costs and Benefits of Regulation FairDisclosure,Securities Industry Association,
at http://wv.sia.com (May, 2001).
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more time and resources to understand and make informed trades
based on the information given by the issuer. 13 5 Furthermore, an evaluation of a SIA survey noted that "investors are not taking advantage of
the increased access to the information provided by the regulation and
that most investors have neither the time nor the inclination to sort
through the data." 13 6 These statistics indicate that Regulation FD has
not achieved its goal of making issuer information equally available to
all investors because many corporations have "chilled" communications due to the fear of non-compliance. Furthermore, the statistics
provided by the SIA indicate that the general investing public is not
even taking advantage of the little information Regulation FD has
3 7
made available to them.'
Another consideration the SEC has yet to address is the current
decline in the use of on-line investing and its impact on the effectiveness of Regulation FD.138 The average volume for on-line trading in
the second quarter of 2000 was 1.1 million trades per day, a decrease of
approximately 20% from the first quarter of 2000.139 On-line trading
volume has decreased to approximately 900,000 trades per day and
there is a substantial likelihood that on-line trading systems will
continue to lose customers faster than they can replace them. 40 Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt believes that the Internet has profoundly effected the way investors participate in the market and that
Regulation FD is necessary in order to provide these individuals with
4
the same access to information that investment professionals have.' '
Regulation FD was promulgated during a time when on-line investing
was at an all-time high. 142 Today the individual on-line investor is trading markedly less than two years ago. 143 These findings in combination with the data provided by the SIA, which indicates that individual
investors are not even using the information that issuers are making
135.
See Id.
136.
Regulation FD Hurts Investors and Contributesto Market Volatility Says SIA, 6 No. 21
ANDREWS SEC. LIT. & REc. REP. 3 (June 6, 2001).
137.
Id.; Costs and Benefits of Regulation FairDisclosure, Securities Industry Association, at http://www.sia.com (May, 2001).
138. John Reed Stark, Enforcement Redux: A Retrospecitve of the SEC's Internet Program
Fouryears After Its Genesis, 57 Bus. LAw. 105 (2001).
139. Id.
140.
Id.
141. Arthur Levitt, Remarks Before the 2000 Annual Meeting Securities Industry
Association, at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch420.htm (Nov. 9, 2000).
142. See Stark, supra note 138.
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available to them, seems to suggest that a broad based regulation is not
necessary.44
Furthermore, in light of effects on the quantity and quality of investment information since the advent of Regulation FD, the SIA's
May, 2001 report on the Regulation indicated that individuals who invested through securities professionals or relied on financial media in
making investment decisions will also suffer from the unintended consequences of Regulation FD. 145 The SIA stated that "[a]ny adverse effects on the information disseminated by the media and the quality of
analyst research will ultimately impact investors." 14 6 The SIA indicated
that the securities industry in the U.S. manages upward of 50 million
investor accounts either directly or through corporate, thrift or pension plans as well as millions of others who invest through mutual
funds. 1 47 The SIA maintains that there is now no longer any leeway in
discussions between analysts and issuers and that Regulation FD has
led to "[m]ore guess work, less real information, [and a] greater propensity for mispricing securities." 148 This means that millions of investors will inadvertently suffer from the implementation of Regulation
149
FD because their investment services are less reliable.
H.

The Effect of Regulation FD on Market Volatility

While certainly not the exclusive factor behind the current market
instability, the implementation of Regulation FD has contributed to
market volatility and therefore diminishes the effectiveness of the Regulation's primary objective, to increase investor confidence and raise
the integrity of the market.' 5 0 While other factors have contributed to
144. Costs and Benefits of Regulation FairDisclosure,Securities Industry Association, at
http://wv.sia.com (May, 2001); Stark, supra note 138.
145. Costs and Benefits ofRegulation FairDisclosure, Securities Industry Association, at
http://v.sia.com (May, 2001).
146. Id.
147. Press Release, Securities Industry Association, SIA Chief Economist Voices
Concern That Reg FD Limits "Quantity, Quality" of Information Investors Receive: Offered Recommendations to Improve Financial Analysis To Help Investors Evaluate Investment Opportunities, SIA Press Release, at http://v.sia.com/press/html/
pr__reg-fd.html (April 24, 2001).
148. Special Study, supra note 7 (quoting David Berry, Rountable Transcript at
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market volatility, such as record level trading volume and analysts conflicts of interest, 15 1 Regulation FD has exacerbated an already unstable
market environment because many corporations are disclosing less information for fear of non-compliance or using the Regulation as an
excuse not to disclose. Both practices make it more difficult for analysts to accurately predict earnings estimates, thus making it harder for
1 52
investors to confidently pick stocks.
The connection between market volatility and Regulation FD
stems from the decrease in quantity and quality of issuer information.' 53 Corporations are erring on the side of caution in not giving
analysts any guidance so as to avoid having to make that information
public) 54 This trend can create uncertainty within the investing public because the lack of investment information may create the false appearance of higher risk and eventually result in lower stock
valuations.' 55 Henry M. Paulson, Jr., the Chairman of Goldman Sachs
Group Inc., the investment banking and securities firm, commented in
November, 2001 that Regulation FD is contributing to instability because negative news is unloaded all at once whereas previously it is was
disseminated a little at a time thus softening the impact on the capital
markets. 15 6 Moreover, the February, 2001 AIMR survey indicated that
25% of its respondents felt that the Regulation had contributed "a lot"
to market volatility, 34% said it contributed "some," and 12% said it
contributed "a little."157 Another survey of 201 publicly held U.S. Corporations was conducted by Price Waterhouse Coopers in September,
2001 and indicated that 19% of the respondents felt that Regulation

151. New York Stock Exchange Fact Book, AIMR Invitation To Comment: Proposed Issues Paper on Analyst Independence, at http://www.aimr.org ("[r] esearch analysts are allowing certain interests, including their firms investment-banking
relationships or personal investments, to influence both the content of their reports
and their consequent investment recommendation.")
152. Laura S. Unger, Fallout From Regulation FD, Has the SEC Finally Cut the
Tightrope? Remarks at the Glasser LegalWorks Conference on SEC Regulation FD at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch421.htm (Oct. 27, 2000); see also Special Study.
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wwv.aimr.com/pressroom/fjnews/fnewsltr.html (Apr., 2001).
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FD resulted in greater stock volatility.' 5 8 While the results of Price
Waterhouse survey are lower than that of the AIMR survey, the SIA
indicated in its Costs and Benefits Analysis that "[t] he majority of market participants feel that Reg. FD contributes to already near record
levels of sustained volatility in securities markets ... [and] agree that
the changes in the process of information dissemination created by the
regulation are likely to contribute significantly to the increase in stock
volatility."1 59
The following examples demonstrate the connections between
market volatility and disclosure pursuant to Regulation FD. In August,
2000, Intel realized that it's third-quarter revenues were going to fall
short of expectations and in accordance with the then proposed SEC
Regulation, Intel announced this information in a press release rather
than selectively disclosing it to influential analysts.1 60 Intel stocks fell
22%.161 Both institutional and individual investors sold as much Intel
stock as possible and a record 300 million shares were traded and $80
billion dollars in market capitalization was lost. 162 Another example
occurred when the public corporation, Internet Security Systems, announced inJuly, 2001 that they had substantially missed on their earnings forecast resulting in a drop in stock prices from $50 on July 2,
2001 to $29 onJuly 3, 2001, a loss of $21 overnight.1 63 Trading volume
on July 3rd was over 15 million shares and the drop was substantial
enough to prompt many individual investors to sell at a loss only to
watch as the stocks rebounded in the following months after institutional investors purchased them.'6 4 Instances like these certainly do
not bolster retail investor confidence in the securities market.
A response to the SIA survey in the Securities Litigation and Regulation Reporter noted that "[a] lthough acknowledging that the fluctuations in the market in the past two quarters are attributable to
158. Price WaterhouseCoopers Survey, at www.barometersurveys.com/pr/
te010423.html (Apr. 23, 2001).
159. Costs and Benefits of Regulation FairDisclosure, Securities Industry Association, at
http://wivv.sia.com (May, 2001).
160. Daniel Gross, New RulingMakes Stock MarketEven More Volatile; Companies Can't
Limit News of LowerDividends to Justa Select Group of ManicuredBrokers, OREGONIAN at B13
(Oct. 24, 2000).
161. Id.
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163. Jay Somaney, Reg ED's Fallout: Increased Volatility, Precipitous Stock Drops,
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multiple factors, the SIA said that Reg. FD has added to the near-record levels of sustained volatility." 16 5 Regulation FD was introduced
during a time of unbridled economic prosperity. 166 Regulation FD's
contribution to market instability, albeit inadvertent, in a time of economic prosperity, does not have the same impact than in a recession.
Current economic conditions coupled with the tragic events of September 11th have created an atmosphere in which it would be appropriate for the SEC to seriously evaluate the impact of the Regulation's
"chilling" effect on market disclosure and the consequences of those
effects in a weak economy, which may make a recovery more difficult
to achieve.
I.

Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading

In the final release of Regulation FD, the SEC maintained that its
primary purpose in promulgating the Regulation was to bolster investor confidence in the integrity of the capital markets that has been
damaged by the practice of selective disclosure. 167 The basis of this
rationale is derived from the Supreme Court decision in United States v.
O'Hagan1 68 which outlined the misappropriation theory of insider
trading liability. 169 The Supreme Court in O'Hagan held that "[t] he
theory is also well-tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act:
to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor
170
confidence."
The SEC recognizes selective disclosure and insider trading as being very similar because both involve information gained from superior access. 17 1 The SEC further believes that both insider trading and
selective disclosure harm the integrity of the market because the general investing public is apt to lose confidence in a market that is dominated by investors who gain their informational edge based on who
they know. 172 Furthermore, the SEC noted in the release of the Final
Rule that the issue of selective disclosure, unlike insider trading, has
not been adequately clarified by the courts and that Regulation FD
165.

Regulation FD Hurts Investors and Contributesto Market Volatility Says SIA, 6 No.21
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166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

New York Stock Exchange Fact Book.
Final Release, supra note 2, at 51,716.
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642.
Id.at 658.
Final Release, supra note 2,at 51,716.
Id.

2001-2002]

CONSEQUENCES OFREGULATION FD

would remedy any shortcomings in this area. 173 While selective disclosure and insider trading do have similar characteristics, the SEC's conclusion regarding the lack of judicial clarification in the area of
selective disclosure does not take into account the Supreme Court's
decision in Dirks v. SEC. The Supreme Court in Dirks provides a sufficient test to differentiate between those who use selectively disclosed
information to their personal advantage and those that do not.' 74 This
distinction is well founded because material information that is disclosed in a selective manner but is not used for one's personal benefit
can beneficially contribute to a healthy competitive capital market
175
system.
Selective disclosure and insider trading, while sharing some common characteristics, are actually two very different violations under the
Exchange Act. They are different particularly because insider trading,
a violation of Section 10b and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, is an anti-fraud
provision whereas selective disclosure in violation of Regulation FD, is
not.176 Distinctions regarding insider trading were made by the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Haganwhich categorized insider trad1 77
ing as either "traditional" or a "misappropriation" of information.
"Traditional" 178 insider trading occurs when a corporate insider in possession of material non-public information makes a trade based on that
information in violation of the fiduciary duty corporate insiders have
to their shareholders. 179 The "misappropriation theory"180 of insider
trading applies to individuals who fraudulently use information given
to them "in connection with" a securities transaction thus violating
Rule 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. 181 "[The misappropriation
theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of
18 2
those who entrusted him with access to confidential information."
Regulation FD requires that:
when an issuer intentionally discloses material nonpublic
information to securities market professionals or holders
173.
174.
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175.
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of the issuer's securities who are reasonably likely to trade
on the basis of the information, it must simultaneously
make public disclosure. When the issuer's selective disclosure of material nonpublic information is not intentional, the issuer must make public disclosure
83
promptly. 1
The theories of both insider trading and Regulation FD focus on punishing or regulating individuals who operate in the market system with
an unfair advantage. 184 The SEC stated in the release of the Final Rule
that given the similarity of both violations, it is equitable to extend the
justification used in support of the misappropriation theory of insider
trading to selective disclosure of material information as well. 185 The
SEC's rationale is based on the increase of investor confidence in the
integrity of the market in the wake of insider trading laws and that
Regulation FD would create a similar outcome for the similar
problems surrounding selective disclosure. 186 While insider trading is
unquestionably harmful to the market, it is not clear that selective disclosure presents the same type of problems that warrant such strict
regulation as not all instances of selective disclosure are for personal
benefit. 187
Selective disclosure can increase market efficiency and has the capability to further the goals of securities law. 188 The Regulation, by
restraining the dialogue between corporations and analysts frustrates
the primary goal of securities law, i.e. disclosure. 89 Furthermore,
given the Supreme Court's holding in Dirks v. SEC, it does not seem
appropriate to argue that since selective disclosure and insider trading
are similar, the justification behind the criminalization of insider trading would appropriately justify the regulation of selective disclosure. It
is inconsistent for the SEC to use the same justification to support of
punishing fraudulent practices of insider trading under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 thereunder and regulating non-fraudulent conversations between an issuer and any individual that would be subject to the
requirements of Regulation FD.
183.
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In Dirks v. SEC, a former officer, the insider/tipper of Equity
Funding Corporation of America (Equity Funding), a publicly traded
corporation, advised Dirks, the tippee and an analyst who specialized
in investment analysis of insurance companies' securities for institutional investors, that there were major incidents of fraud ongoing at
the company.1 90 Dirks requested the Wall StreetJournalwrite an article
on the matter, but the paper declined. 191 Dirks then conducted his
own investigation and while the stories of alleged fraud were corroborated by certain company employees, they were denied by management. 192 Neither Dirks, nor anyone at his firm, owned any securities in
Equity Funding, but during his investigation of the company Dirks
gave certain information to clients and investors, some of whom traded
on the information.' 9 3 Dirks was originally charged with aiding and
abetting a lOb-5 violation by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of the investment community who sold their stock in Equity Funding without making the information known to the general investing
public. 194 Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that Dirks was not derivatively liable under the tipper's breach
of duty to disclose or abstain.' 95 In support of its conclusion, the
Court reasoned that in calculating whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain, it is necessary to determine whether the
insider's "tip" constituted a breach of the corporate insider's fiduciary
duty. Absent said duty, there cannot be a derivative breach by the corporate insider/tipper. 196 A duty to disclose does not arise simply because one has access to information due to their position in the
market.'9 7 Thus, the Supreme Court expressly considered and rejected the notion that the mere possession of material nonpublic information, absent a duty to shareholders, could create the obligation to
disclose or abstain.' 98 The Supreme Court's "personal benefits" 199 test
established in Dirks permitted instances of selective disclosure as long
as (1) the corporate insider did not breach his or her fiduciary duty to
the shareholders; (2) a corporate insider did not benefit personally
from the disclosure, such as pecuniary gain or reputational benefit that
could develop into future earnings; and (3) the recipient did not know
190.
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that receipt of the information would be a breach of fiduciary care.2 00
In Dirks, the corporate insider/tipper was found not to have breached
his duty to disclose or abstain because" [the tipper] received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor was
their purpose to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks ... the
tippers were motivated by a desire to expose fraud." 20 1 The Supreme
Court realized that imposing liability for making selectively disclosed
statements would have an inhibiting influence on the role of market
analysts which the SEC itself recognizes are necessary to preserve a
20 2
healthy market.
Permissible instances of selective disclosure differ from insider
trading. Selectively disclosed information is used by analysts in the
evaluation of a corporation while with insider trading the purpose is
"manipulation or deception" 20 3 for personal gain. 20 4 Unless there is
evidence that the information disseminated was used to willfully defraud,20 5 analysts can not be liable and/or culpable under lOb-5, as
fraudulent activity is necessary in order to invoke rule lOb-5. 206 The
broad use of a regulation to deal with disclosure practices that have
already been addressed in Dirks v. SEC is unnecessary and over burdensome. The Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC ruled in favor of allowing
selective disclosure as long as the court's "personal benefits" 20 7 test was
fulfilled. 20 8 Insider trading practices were clearly distinguished from
selective disclosure in Dirks v. SEC and by differentiating one practice
from the other, the Supreme Court implicitly precluded the use of the
underlying rationale of the "misappropriation theory" 2 0 9 of insider
trading from being extended to justify the regulation of selective
disclosure.
Lastly, it is important to consider whether the Regulation, as enacted, is more extensive than is necessary to further the SEC's policies.2 10 The primary goal of the Regulation is to level the investor
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
See Dirks, 463 U.S. 646.
Dirks, 462 U.S. at 663.
Id.
Dirks, 462 U.S. at note 27.
See Dirks, 463 U.S. 646.
Id.

208.

Id.

209. See O'Hagan,521 U.S. 642.
210. Laura S. Unger, Fallout From Regulation FD, Has the SEC Finally Cut the
Tightrope? Remarks at the Glasser LegalWorks Conference on SEC Regulation FD at
http://v.sec.gov/news/speech/spch421.htm (Oct. 27, 2000).

2001-2002]

CONSEQUENCES OFREGULATION ED

playing field.2 11 It appears the Regulation has gone too far.2 12 All of

the negative consequences that have surfaced in the wake of Regulation FD, particularly the "chilling effect" 21 3 and the impact on market
volatility, seem to suggest that the Regulation has not only stifled communication but also damaged investor confidence in the market.2 1 4
Furthermore, the Regulation appears to be unnecessary as many corporations were already beginning to open conference calls with analysts and large investors to the public. 21 5 According to a recent study
done by the National Investors Relations Institute (NIRI), 82% of companies that conduct conference calls with analysts or big investors
opened the calls to the general public, an increase of 55% from the
previous year.2 16 The statistics indicate that corporations were already
moving in the direction of general rather than selective disclosure but
unfortunately, Regulation ED has stifled this natural trend toward corporate disclosure as the Regulation has clearly affected the quantity
and quality of information that corporations are now willing to disclose
217
publicly.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Regulation ED, while not only complicated in its interpretation
and negative in its effects, is more intrusive than necessary.2 18 The
SEC should continue to encourage corporations to open analyst conference calls to the general public and revise the Regulation to reflect
the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC. This would permit corporations to selectively disclose so long as their disclosure does not
violate the "personal benefits" 2 1 9 test set forth in Dirks. Complete pro:hibition of selective disclosure is an overly broad reaction to instances
of selective disclosure that constitute 10b-5 violations. While the underlying goal of Regulation FD is laudable, the Regulation, as enacted,
has effectively curtailed corporate disclosure and should be revised. 220
The SEC, in its effort to resolve the issue of unequal access to invest211.
212.
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ment information existing between small individual investors and
larger institutional investors, has created a larger inequity that burdens
22 1
the millions of investors who use professional analyst services.
These consequences, viewed in light of the distinction made between
selective disclosure and insider trading by the Supreme Court in Dirks
v. SEC, suggest that selective disclosure can be beneficial to the market
economy while monitoring the prohibition against the unlawful use of
"material nonpublic" 222 information.
The use of the "personal benefits '223 test established in Dirks v.
SEC on a case by case basis presents a more effective way to approach
questionable selective disclosure practices. 224 The use of a case by case
method of evaluation rather than the use of a broad based regulation
would still regulate the practice of selective disclosure while keeping
the lines of communication between issuers and analysts open. 225 The
Commission has expressed concern over "suspicious market-moving
trading activity occurring shortly after, or even during, analyst
calls... [and] such activity may undermine the confidence of investors
in the fairness of our markets." 2 26 Therefore, if it is possible for the
commission to identify suspicious instances of selective disclosure,
then addressing them on a case by case basis is also possible. This
would help alleviate the effect of the negative consequences that the
Regulation has inadvertently created since corporations could communicate with analysts without having to adhere to the complicated and
clouded requirements of Regulation FD. These changes would still allow the SEC to continue its effort in bolstering investor confidence in
the securities markets while coinciding with the underlying goals and
policies of the federal securities laws and SEC regulations, the promo22 7
tion of full and fair disclosure.
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